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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
OTHO R. MURPHY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
GRAND COUNTY, UTAH, a body 
corporate and politic, and MAR-
GIE M. SHAFER, County Clerk of 
Grand County, Utah and Ex-Offi-
cio County Auditor, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 7998 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF GRAND 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
STATEMENT OF F AC.TS 
The facts of this case are as set forth in plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint and as alleged and admitted by de-
:Dendants: That Grand County, Utah is a body corporate 
and politic and that the defendant Margie M. Shafer was, 
at the commencement of this action, and at the time 
judgm,ent was entered, the County Clerk of Grand County 
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and Ex-Officio County Auditor; (Record, pp. 17, 24, 36); 
that plaintiff was duly elected to the office of County At-
torney of Grand County on the 7th day of November, 1950; 
that he duly qualified and entered upon the performance 
of his duti·es in that offic·e on the 1st day of January, 1951, 
and ever since, he has been, and is now the duly ~elected, 
qualified and acting county attorney of said county, (Re-
cord, pp. 17, 24, 36) ; that on April 3, 1950, pursuant to 
Section 19-13-15, u.cA 1943, as amended, and within the 
time therein specified, the then county commissioners of 
Grand County, Utah pretended to fix the salary of the 
county -attorney for the term commencing January 1, 1951, 
and fix·ed the sum of $10.00 per year (Record, pp. 7, 10, 24, 
37) ; that the salary of plaintiff's predec·essor in the office 
of oounty attorney was $1,000.00 per year (Record, pp. 18, 
24, 37) ; that at the tim·e said purported salary of $10.00 
per year was fixed, Grand County, Utah had an assessed 
valuation of $4,976,687 .00, and was a county of the Fourth 
Class as provided by Section 19-13-13, U·CA 1943, as 
amended (Record, p. 8) and the maximum salary for the 
office of county attorney for said county was $L800.00 
per year (Record, pp. 8, 34, 37; Section 19-13-14, UCA 1943 
as amended); that the plaintiff p~esented his claim for 
salary as county attorney to the board of county commis-
sioners of Grand County on the basis of $1,000.00 per year 
and his claim was rejected, whereupon this suit was insti-
tuted (R.ecord, pp. 25, 32, 38) ; that Section 19-13-15, UCA 
1943 as amended, provides as follows: 
"The Board of County Commissioners shall 
biennially (sic) at a meeting held at least six 
months prior to the election of county officers, fix 
and determine the salaries of the county officers, 
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for whom maximum salaries are fixed, for the 
term next succeeding; provided that the salaries 
of such officers shall not be diminished or incr,eas-
ed for the term for which they were elected and 
shall have qualified; and provided further, that 
should any board fail to fix the salary of any of 
the county officers as provided in this section, the 
salary of the predecessor of said officer w hos·e 
salary has been fixed shall apply; provided how-
ever said boards of County Commissioners may on 
or before July 1, 1949 fix the salaries of county 
offioers in amounts which in their opinion will 
establish sufficient and proper salaries for serv-
ices rendered or to be rendered by officers whose 
salaries are so fix~ed ; and provided further that 
the maximum salaries for oounty officers shall not 
exc·eed in amount the maximum salaries as set 
forth in Section 19-13-14 hereof." 
Reference by appellants in their Statem·ent of Facts 
contained in their brief to the "write-in" vote which elected 
plaintiff, estoppel by reason of a "news item" appearing in 
the Times-Independent. of Moab, Utah and the limitation 
of the budget of Grand Cbunty as a defense, involves the 
correctness of the ruling of the trial court and such matters 
are not material facts pertaining to the issues of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Board of County Commissioners of Grand County. 
Utah failed to exercise a fair and reasonabl~e discretion in 
fixing the sum of $10.00 per year as the salary for the 
County Attorney. 
The court found that the sum of $10.00 per year was 
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so small as to amount to no compensation at all for the 
duti~es imposed by law upon the office of county attorney 
and was ca1culated to discourage anyone from seeking said 
office, or to Hmit aspirants to those willing to render the 
s·ervic-e gratuitously, in violation of the provisions of Sec-
tion 10, Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah as amended, that "A county attorney shall be elected 
by the qualified voters of each county .... " (Record, pp. 
34, 37). 
The trial court stated in its Memorandum Decision: 
"One need but scan the index of our Code 
under the title 'County Attorney' to obtain a real-
ization of the importance of the office. Chapter 
15, Title 19 enumerates his general duties. It is 
im·portant to note that he must pass upon the 
legality of County Commissioners claims for ex-
penses (19-11-14), and that it is made his duty to 
sue the Board to set aside excessive levies made 
by them (80-9-19). I mention these particular 
provisions, and could mention many mo~e, to point 
out that a County Attorney has many functions 
to perform which ·could not well be controlled by 
the Commissioners, notwithstanding the provi-
sions of Section 19-5-9. The importance of the 
office and the duti~es to be performed could not 
well be excluded from ·consideration in determin-
ing the salary to be fixed for the office. . . . . 
They (county commissioners) must, how·ev·er, 
hav~e anticipated that their action would discour-
age anyone from s·eeking the office or in any 
event to limit aspirants to the office to those who 
w~ere willing to render the service gratuitously, 
and whatever their motives, the fixing of a fair 
salary as compensation for the duties to be per-
formed was not among the~m." (Record, p. 34). 
The case of State ex rei. Yeargin v. Maschke et al .. 
(Wash. 1916) 155 Pac. 1064, is in point. The state consti-
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tution authorized the appointment by the judge of the 
Superior Court of the county of a ~court commissioner who 
should perform "like duties as a judge of the superior 
court at chambers, and perform such other duties con-
nected with the administration of justice as may be pre-
scrihed by law." The law provided that the court com-
missioner '~be allowed a salary in addition to :fees ·provided 
for, in such sum as the board of ·county commission~rs may 
designate." Prior to April 12, 1913 the salary had been 
$15.00 per month. On that date the commissioners reduced 
the salary to $1.00 per month ($12 per y·ear) : The relator 
brought suit. The court found that the commissioners 
were prompted by wrong motives. In the course of the 
opinion the court states: 
"It remains to inquire whether the board in 
fixing the salary of the court commissioner at 
$1 per month exercised an honest discretion, or 
acted arbitrarily or fvom improper motives, and 
thus faHed to exercise that discretion which the 
law demands. * * * * * They seem to have been 
actuated by one motive, and that was to so reduce 
the salary as to force the resignation of the 
~elator from that offioe. This was a g:r.oss abuse 
of discretion." 
It is submitted that the essence of that holding is that 
in fixing the salary at $1.00 per month, the commissioners 
faHed to exercise a legal discretion. The fact that they were 
prompted by wrong motives does not detract from the force 
of that holding. 
II 
The court has the power to review the action of the 
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county commissioners to determine whether they have 
exercis-ed a legal discretion. 
The substance and burden of appellants' argument 
and brief are that the Board has absolute disc~etion in the 
matter of salary for county officers within the maximum 
set by law and that the court has no power to review the 
action of the board. The l~eading cas~e cited by appellants, 
and from which they quote extensively, should be sufficient 
answer to their contention: 
". . . . . . If the theory of the appellants be cor-
rect, that the action of the board is final and can-
not be review·ed by the courts, the taxpay~er in one 
of the smaller counties may see the salaries fixed 
at the maximum, without regard to the amount 
of labor to be performed or other circumstances, 
contrary to the public interests, and be powerless 
to remedy the wrong .... " Reynolds v. Board of 
Commissioners, 6 Idaho 787, 59 Pac. 730. 
While in the case just cited the court was concerned 
about the max~mum salary being against the public inter-
est under some circumstanc·es, by the same .token, a salary 
fixed at so low a figure as to prevent the candidacy for the 
office of county attorney, would place the choice for that 
office completely in the hands of the commissioners in 
which case they could pay whatev·er compensation they 
desired to a "favorite", to the detriment of the public 
interests. 
Appellants als·o cited the case of Cawsey v. Brichey, 82 
Wash. 653, 144 Pac. 938. (Appellants' Brief, p. 6). In that 
cas·e the court says, at page 942 : 
". . . . The declared purpose of the act is the pro-
tection, propagation, and restoration of game, etc. 
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The powers conferred upon the game ·oommission 
must be construed with reference to that pur-
pose. The power to set aside lands as a game 
preserve necessarily implies not an arbitrary se-
lection, but a selection of lands peculiarly suitable 
for that purpose. The act, reasonably construed, 
gives no power to select any other lands. True it 
gives the commission a discretion, but the whol~e 
purpose of the act furnishes a guide and marks a 
limit to that discretion which excludes the right to 
act avbitrarily .... " 
Referring again to the case of State ex rei. Yeargin v. 
Maschke et al., supra, the court says : 
"The general rule, of course, is, that the dis-
cretionary power of the hoard of ·county commis-
sioners is not subj eet to review by the court. But 
this is not a universal rule. If the action of the 
board of county commissioners is arbitrary or 
capricious, or if its action is prompted by wrong 
motives, there is not only an abus~e of dis·cretion, 
but in contemplation of law there has been no 
exercise of the discretionary power. If an honest 
discretion, as demanded by the law, has not been 
exercised, the result is to substitute arbitrary ac-
tion f.or such discretion. If a tribunal such as the 
board of county commissioners acts arbitrarily, or 
refuses to exercise its discr~etion, the law will by 
mandamus require it to exercise its discretionary 
power." 
From the foregoing it is made abundantly clear that 
the courts may review the action of the county commis-
sioners. If further proof is necessary, our own court has 
announced its views on the question in the case of Startup 
v. Harmon et al., Com'rs of Utah County, 59 Utah 329; 203 
pac. 637 @ 639 : 
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" It is true the commissioners have the discre-
tion to determine the amount necessary to be 
provided, but it is not an arbitrary discretion; it is 
a discretion that may be abused, and whenever 
abuse is properly charged the question may be 
reviewed ev~en in a mandamus proceeding. 18 
R.C.L. p. 126; 26 Cyc. 161, 162." 
The appellants put a great deal of emphasis on the 
fact that there was no evidence offered by plaintiff to 
prove the motive whi~ch prompted the ·Board's action. 
When the case cam·e on for trial, both sides rested and the 
cause was submitted on the record. 
"The court is justified in finding facts as 
they are alleged .and admitted or not denied in the 
pleadings." 64 C. J. 1259, Trial, Sec. 1106 
The essential facts of this case are all admitted. As 
set forth in the Statement of Facts, the plaintiff was duly 
elected; he qualified and entered upon the performance of 
his duties as county attorney and ever since, he has been 
and is now the duly elected, qualified and acting county 
attorney of defendant county. The board of county com-
missioners in due time, purported to fix the salary for the 
office of county attorney and fixed the same at $10.00 per 
year. The salary of plaintiff's predecessor was $1,000.00 
per y~ear. 
It may be that the "finding" that the sum of $10.00 
per year was so low "as to amount to no compensation at 
all" is a legal conclusion drawn by the trial judge from the 
facts as set forth in the pleadings and record. The fact 
that it is included in the findings cannot prejudice the 
defendants. 
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"Under the practice in most jurisdictions, the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by 
the trial judge in a case tried without a jury are 
to be separately stated, although a failure to do 
so may not be a ground for reversal where no 
p!'ejudice results .... Propos~itions which are in 
reality conclusions of law cannot be given effect 
as findings even though included with the find-
ings of fact ........ . 
In determining the character- of a finding, the 
court will look to the substance theveof rather 
than its classification. Conclusions. drawn by the 
court in the exercise of its legal judgment from 
facts found by it are conclusions of law, although 
denominated findings of fact." 53 Am. Jur. 793-
794; Trial, Section 1138. 
If $10.00 per year is no salary, then the Board failed 
to fix any salary for the term beginning January 1, 1951. 
Not having fixed any salary, the salary of plaintiff's prede-
cessor prevails under the statute. 
Appellants argue that the trial court substituted its 
discretion for that of the commissiioners. This is not so. 
The trial court found that the commissioners had fixed no 
salary. The law, Section 19-13-15, UCA, 1943 as amended, 
then applies. This court ,must decide whether the trial 
court erred in concluding that $10.00 per year was no 
salary for the county attorney under the circumstances. 
Appellants also argue, in this oonnection, that "If the 
Board abused its discvet:ion then it should be compelled 
to exercise its discretion within reason and not be r·equired 
to accept the judgment of the court as to what is a reason-
able salary for the office of county attorney of Grand 
County." (Appellants' Brief p. 14). If this theory be 
correct, then the whole purpose of Section 19-13-15, UCA 
1943 as amended would be def,eated. The salary would be 
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determined by considering the particular person who held 
office. In other words, the salary would be fixed after it 
was known to the Board who had been elected to the office, 
and the amount determined in the light of that knowledge. 
To prevent this sort of thing, the Legislature provided 
that if no salary was fixed within the time specifi,ed, the 
salary of the prede·c~essor should prevail. Our Legislature 
has set no minimum salary as have the legislatures of most 
other states. Therefore, a reasonatble amount in the honest 
discretion of the Board is all that is required. If this is not 
provided, then the salary of the predecessor in office is 
the maximum and the mini,mum. 
Appellants in their Bri,ef (p. 14-15) cite and quote ex-
tensiv~ely from the case of Merwin v. Board of Com'rs, 
(Colo. 1901) 67 Pac. 285, apparently ~or the propositions 
that the court may not substitute its judgment for that of 
the Board, but if the board has failed to act, then the 
court can compel it to act; and that "Where one enters 
into a public office for which no compensation has been 
provided by law, he is presumed to give his services: .... " 
The case is not in point. In the :f.irst place, under the Utah 
law the Board cannot be oompeUed to act. It ·either fixes a 
reasonabl~e salary for the office, or the salary of the prede-
cessor prevails. In the second place, the Colorado law pro-
vided that deputy district attorneys should not be allowed 
any fees for attendance before justices of the peace in 
misdemeanors ; and the county commissioners ''might, in 
their discretion, disallow any charges against the county 
for fees or costs of district attorneys, or other persons, for 
the trial or examination of any criminal case, before any 
justice of the peace, poliee magistrate, police judge, or any 
court not being a court of record." It was for such serv-
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ices that the plaintiff in that case was suing £or the value 
of his services. There is no similarity between that case 
and the instant case. 
As to the proposition that plaintiff is presumed to give 
his services in an office for which no salary is provided, 
it is submitted that this is untenable under the Utah l~aw. 
Else why the provision that the salary of the predecessor 
shall prevail where no salary is fixed? 
III 
Plaintiff is not estopped from cl~aiming salary in the 
amount provided for his predecessor in office. 
A. An elective office is not a ,contract and the ele-
ments of estoppel do not apply. 
"The salary of a public offi,cer is an emolu-
ment of the office and rules governing contractual 
velations 'and obligations in ordinary cases are not 
applicable in fixing such salary." Cahill v. Bel-
trami County, (Minn.) 29 N.W. (2d) 444; 
"A public officer cannot estop himself from 
claiming his statu tory salary by agreeing to ac-
cept or by ~acc,epting a lesser sum than is provided 
by statute." Fannin County v. Dobbs, (Texas) 202 
s.w. (2d) 950. 
B. Notice of salaries fixed unnecessary. 
In the matter of fixing salaries of county officers, 
there is nothing in the statute that provides for official 
notice of the amounts so fix,ed, so that assuming that 
plaintiff knew of the amount provided by the Board was 
$10.00 per year, knowledge did not prevent him from 
claiming his s,alary as provided by law. 
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Even if official notice was required, it is submitted 
that the news item contained in the Times-Independent, 
issue of April 6, 1950, pertaining to the salary of the 
county attorney was not sufficient. The only reference to 
that matter in the news item was two and one-fourth lines 
of small type at the end of the repo:vt entitled "LET CON-
TRACT FOIR 0 1ILING AIRP10 1RT * * *: the salary of county 
attorney was reduced from $1000.00 to $10.00 per year". 
(Record p. 15) 
IV 
The county commissioners may not, by reducing sal-
ary or otherwise, abolish an ·elective office created by the 
Constitution. 
In Argyle vs. Wright, 63 Utah 184; 224 Pac. 649, the 
plaintiff sought a writ of mandate against the county 
auditor of Utah County, compelling him to draw his w·ar-
rant in fav;or of plaintiff for a years salary as county 
surveyor, to which office plaintiff has been duly elected 
and had qualified. Def.endants ·contended that plaintiff 
had abandoned his offi0e and the trial court so concluded. 
This conclusion was revers·ed on appeal and this court in 
the course of its opinion at page 651 of the Pacific citation 
states: 
"No authority is found in the statutes of this 
state authorizing boards of county commissioners 
to remove a county officer from office or to de-
clare a vacancy by any act on the part of such 
commissioners." 
In the case of Sheriff of Salt Lake County v. Board of 
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Com'rs 71 Utah 593; 268 Pac. 783, the county commission-
ers suspended six deputy sheriffs on the theory that they, 
the commissioners, had the absolute power and right to do 
so. In denying the commissioners' power to suspend the 
deputies, and making permanent the writ of prohibition 
prayed for, this court stated: 
"The Sheriff's office is an elective office of 
the county, as is also the office of a county com-
missioner, and is a co-ordinate office or branch 
of our county government. His pow~ers and duties 
are prescribed by statute and are similar to those 
generally prescribed by other western states. In 
performing them, he, generally speaking, acts in-
dependently of the board of county commissioners 
except as otherwise restricted and specified by 
statute." 
I~t is submitted that the quotation can be paraphr·as~ed 
to apply to the office of county attorney with the same 
effect ·as it applied to the office of the sheriff. 
"The phrase 'by and with the consent and 
approval of the board of county commissioners,' 
contained in section 7873, supra, is not involved in 
the facts now presented. That phrase vests no dis-
cretion in the board of county commissioners in 
so far as the duty to mak~e provision for the pay-
ment of the salary of the position is ·concerned. 
That phrase does vest a discretion in the hoard, 
whereby it determines whether a nomination of an 
individual for appointm·ent to the position shall be 
confirmed or rejected. The position created cannot 
be abolished by failuve to provide a salary." 
Board of County Com'rs of Mcintosh County et al. 
v. Kirby, Court Clerk, et al. Okl. 1935) 49 p. (2d) 
746. 
"Section 4448, O.S. 1931, provides that in 
every county in the state there shall be appointed 
by the State Commissioner of Health a county 
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superintendent of public health. This section fur-
ther prescri1bes his qualifications and duties. Sec-
tion 7770, O.S. 1931, directs that the board of 
county commissioners shall pay him certain desig-
nated compensation. . . . . . We held in Board of 
County Commissioners of M·clntosh County et al. 
v. Kirby, 17 4 Okl. 20, 49 P. (2d) 7 46, that no dis-
cretion is lodged in the hoard of county commis-
sioners in so far as the duty to make provisions 
for the payment of the salary or a deputy court 
clerk is concerned. We also held that the position, 
created by the Legisla tu~e, cannot be abolished 
by failure to provide a salary by appropriation, 
and also affirmed ·a writ of mandamus to make 
the appropriation, granted in that action by the 
lower court." Board of Com'rs of Carter County et 
al. v. Dorough, (Okl. 1936) 59 P. (2d) 273. 
v 
The appellants ave not prevented by budget limita-
tions from paying plaintiff the salary due him. 
The case of Startup v. Harmon, 59 Utah 329; 203 Pac. 
637, ·c·ited aJbove, is sufficient answ·er to appellants' argu-
ment. This court stated, at page 639 of the Pacific cita-
tion: 
"It is further contended as matter of defense 
that there are no funds at present out of which 
provision can be expressly made for the purpose 
demanded in this proceeding. Ordinarily such a 
defens~e is a complete answer to an application for 
a writ of mandate; that which is impossible can-
not justly be required. But assuming there are no 
funds at the present time available for the pur-
pose in question, it does not necessarily follow 
that such condition must continue indefinitely. 
Utah county is a quasi public corporation, a legal 
subdivision of the state, with ample power to 
assess and collect taxes for all legitimate purposes 
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authorized by the laws of the state. It is quite 
true that taxes must be assessed, levied, and col-
lected at the time and in the manner provided by 
law. Defendants contend that it is now too late 
to assess and collect additional taxes for the year 
1921. They also insist that it is too early to com-
pel the assessment and collection of taxes for the 
year 1922. It is also suggested that no ·person has 
the right to anticipate that defendants will refuse 
to make the provision that may be required in 
1922, and that until defendants do refuse there 
is no ground for action against them. Upon this 
point they cite High on E~xtraordinary Legal Rem-
edies (3d Ed.) p. 17, page 160, par. 144, and page 
19, par. 14; also State v. Rising 15 Nev. 164. 
"The contention, to say the least, is ingenious, 
if not disingenuous. If i~t is too late to assess and 
collect taxes for 1921, because the time has past 
within which it can lawfully be done, and too 
·early for 1922, because the time when it can be 
done has not yet arrived, it is easy to see, in a 
meritorious case, that grave injustice might be 
done; in fact it might happen, if the rule contend-
ed for were rrigidly enforced, that relief in a case 
of this kind ·could never be obtained. The conten-
tion of defendants is squarely met hy a somewhat 
lengthy quotation furnished by plaintiff from a 
Colorado case reported in 110 Pac. 197 . . . '' 
VI 
The court did not err in striking Third and Fourth 
Defenses of ans~wer. 
The appellants complain at the action of the ·court in 
striking the Third and Fourth Defenses of their answer 
(Appellants' Brief p. 3) . 
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Strike on or about the 8th 
day of May, 1952 (R.ecord, p. 28), and the same came on 
regularly for hearing June 17, 1952 (Record, p. --------------· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
Minute Entry, June 17, 1952). The court sustained the 
motion " ... with the understanding that on pretrial coun-
sel for defendant may be heard on the motion if he so 
desires." 
Counsel for defendants made no move to argue the 
matter or to vacate the court's or-der striking the Third 
and Fourth Defenses. 
Rule 7 (b) (2) URJCP reads in part as follows: 
". . . .E~xcept as otherwise specifically provid-
ed by these rules, any order made without notice 
to the adverse party may be vacated or modified 
without notice by the judge who made it, or may 
be vacated or modifi,ed on notic~e ..... " 
Therefore, even if the court erred in sustaining the 
plaintiff's Motion to Strike the defendants' Third and 
Fourth Defens~es, defendants' may not be heard to com-
plain for their failure to move for a vacation or modi-
fication of the court's order. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSI10N 
By way of Summary and Conclusion, this court is 
confronted with the facts: (a) that the office of County 
Attorney in the State of Utah is, and was a ·constitutional 
and ~elective office in each County; (b) that Grand County, 
Utah was a county of the Fourth Class with the maximum 
salary for the office of county attorney fixed by the Legis-
lature at $1800.00 per year; (c) that the salary of the 
plaintiff's predecessor in office was $1000.00 per y()ar; (d) 
that the Board of County Commissioners of Grand County, 
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Utah, on April 3, 1950, fixed the sum of $10.00 per year as 
"compensation" for the performance of the duties of ·coun-
ty attorney of Grand County for the term com,mencing 
January 1, 1951; (~e) that plaintiff was duly ·elected on 
November 7, 1950 to the office of county attorney of Grand 
County, and on the 1st day of January, 1951, duly qualified 
and entered upon the performanc·e of his duties as such 
attorney, and ·ever since, he has been, and is now the duly 
elected, qualified and acting County Attorney of Grand 
County, Utah; (f) that plaintiff duly presented his claim 
for salary as such county attorney on the basis of $1000.00 
per year and his claim was rejected and disallow·ed by . the 
Board of County Commissioners. 
Even if it be conceded that the Board had no ulterior 
motive in fixing the sum of $10.00 per year as "compen-
sation" for the performance of the duties of county attor-
ney, yet they must have intended the consequences of 
their action deliberately taken. 
" ..... The result either way, as a practical 
matter, simply brings the bridge into the district 
for taxation purpos·es. Such inevitably is the sole 
result of including the river within the district, 
and legislative bodies, as well as individuals, must 
be presumed to have intended the necessary and 
inevitable result of their action." Portland Gen-
eral Electric Co. V. City of Estacada, (Ore. 1952) 
241 P. 2d 1129 @ 1145. 
They could not s·eriously have expected any person to 
have undertaken the duties and responsibilities of such an 
office for such a small compensation. The idea is palpably 
aJbsurd. They must have anticipated that no person would 
choose to run for offic,e for such a nominal "salary". 
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Therefore they must have intended to prevent the candi-
dacy of any person for the office of County Attorney. 
The answer to the argument that a nominal "salary" 
did not prevent the election of a county attorney is found 
in the basis for this suit :-that $10.00 per year is not a 
salary; that the Board of 'County Commissioners failed to 
fix any salary for the office of ·county attorney for the 
term commencing January 1, 1951 and that the salary of 
plaintiff's predecessor, to wit, $1000.00 per year, is the 
salary to which he is entitled. 
August, 1953 
Respectively submitted 
HA~M~MOND & HAMMOND 
By Mark Hammond 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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